The cases which enjoyed such unusual attention from the Court had originally asked only that the Court unravel several important but minor mysteries which were the heritage of the celebrated case of Helvering v. Hallock. 0 1 That case, it will be recalled, involved a transfer in trust under which the settlor had created a life estate in his wife, the principal to be paid to him if he survived his wife but to his children if he pre-deceased her. Looking to the fact that "the settlement provides for return or reversion of the corpus to the donor upon a con-13. Foosaner, supra note 12, at 444. 14. See note 147 infra.
15. 14 FE. REG.1824 (1949 tingency terminable at his death," the Court held that the trust was a taxable "transfer . . . intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at . . . death." The Court reaffirmed its still earlier decision in Klein v. United States, 21 where it had said: "It is perfectly plain that the death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which brought the larger estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living, thus satisfying the terms of the taxing act and justifying the tax imposed." 22 The Hallock opinion had started the "possession or enjoyment" clause back on the road from rags to riches. But it left unanswered a number of questions, among them the following:
(1) Is the transfer taxable if the settlor's reversionary interest is not expressly reserved, as in the Hallock case, but arises "by operation of law"? This occurs, for example, when the settlor provides that the remaindernmen must be living at his death to receive the corpus, but neglects to name an alternate taker. Consequently, a "resulting trust" (a reversionary interest) may arise in favor of the settlor.
(2) Is the transfer taxable no matter how slim the settlor's chance to reacquire the property? In the Hallock case, the corpus would revert to him if he survived his wife. But what if the return of the corpus to the settlor depends upon an unlikely contingency, such as his survivorship of children and grandchildren? 23 (3) In what sense must the transfer have been "intended" to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death? Suppose, for example, the reversionary interest, especially if remote, exists only because the draughtsman of the trust instrument (without the settlor's knowledge) had either overlooked a contingency which would create a resulting trust or, out of an excess of caution, provided for return of the corpus upon some contingency?
These were the narrow issues which confronted the Supreme Court upon the first argument in the Church and Spiegel cases. In each the settlor's reversionary interest (if he had one, which was disputed) arose only by operation of law and not by express reservation. And in each the interest was very remote and, it was argued, not consciously "intended" by the settlor. In deciding the Spiegel case, the Court did not stray far from these issues. But the decision in the Church case was on broader grounds, though even here the Court did not range as far afield as might have been expected from the questions which counsel were requested to discuss on reargument. The occasion for the breadth of decision in the Church case was that the decedent had retained a life estate in the transferred property, in addition to the asserted reversionary interest. The Court held that the settlor's retention of the income, even without a reversionary interest, branded the trust as a "transfer . . . intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at . . . his death." The decision was in harmony with the uniform construction of this clause in the state death tax statutes, 2 5 from which it was borrowed by the 1916 federal statute. 23 Though title to the remainder interests in such a trust may be vested in the remaindermen when the trust is created, the state cases recognized that they do not gain "possession or enjoyment" of the corpus until the settlor's death. Moreover, the inclusion of such trusts had been recognized as a practical necessity: "It is true that an ingenious mind may devise other means of avoiding an inheritance tax, but the one commonly used is a transfer with reservation of a life estate." 27 Yet in 1930 the Supreme Court had held in May v. Heiner that such a trust was not "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at . . . death." Mr. Justice McReynolds' characteristically cryptic-and criticized-opinion 2 -in effect equated the statutory words "possession or enjoyment" with the concept of title:
"At the death of Mrs. May [the settlori no interest in the property held under the trust deed passed from her to the living; title thereto had been definitely fixed by the trust deed." (1933) . Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has Eaid that such a transfer "is as nearly the substitute for a bequest as it can be and still remain a gift at all," hinting that the resernation of income from transferred property might stamp the transfer ipso facto as a gift in contemplation of death. II. THE SPIEGEL CASE The trust provisions. The Spiegel trust (created in 1920) provided that the income should be paid to the settlor's three children during his life. Upon his death, the corpus was to be divided among these children, with the share of any deceased child going to the surviving children of that child or, in the absence of surviving children, to the settlor's other children or to their descendants. There was no gift over in the event that all of the settlor's children and their descendants predeceased the settlor. The Commissioner asserted that upon such a predecease of all beneficiaries the trust would fail and the corpus would be held upon a resulting trust for the settlor and that the settlor, therefore, had retained a reversionary interest by operation of law. The executors conceded that this would be true if the remainders of the three children were contingent upon their surviving the settlor. But in their view the remainder interest of each child was not contingent but vested and would pass (if the child died before the termination of the trust upon the settlor's death) to his legatees or next of kin, unless divested in favor of the settlor's other children or children's descendants living at the settlor's death. Thus, the executors asserted, the grantor had no reversionary interest: under no circumstances could the property return to him. 33 The Tax Court held that the settlor had no reversionary interest and that the corpus was not taxable. 4 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, 35 agreeing with the Commissioner: " . . . iThe interests under this trust did not vest upon the execution of the trust, as contended by the taxpayer, and could only vest upon the happening of the condition precedent, namely, that the 32. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303 (1938). 33. Their argument may be recapitulated as follows: Any child who survived the settlor would receive his third of the corpus. If he predeceased the settlor, his third would pass (a) to his surviving children, if any, or (b) to the other two children or to their descendants, if any survived the settlor, or (c) to the predeceasing child's legatees or next of kin, if neither condition (a) nor condition (b) was satisfied. Of course, the settlor might be the legatee or next of kin of one of his children. But then he would get the property back not because he had reserved an interest in it, but because the child in effect had donated it back to him. See note 69 infra.
34. CCH TC Satv., Dec. 14,424(M) (1945 (Vol. 58: 825 beneficiaries or some of them survive the settlor, and this was the 'event which brought the larger estate into being for the' beneficiaries. If none of the beneficiaries survived the settlor, and that was a possibility, then the trust failed, and the trustees would hold the bare naked title to the corpus as resulting trustees for the settlor . . .This possibility that the property might return to the settlor was sufficient upon which to fasten the estate tax provisions. That the property might return to the settlor by operation of law rather than by the terms of the instrument is of no significance." '
The existence of a reversionary interest. The contention most strongly urged by Spiegel's executors in their brief before the Supreme Court was that the court of appeals had misinterpreted Illinois law in holding that Spiegel possessed a reversionary interest in the trust corpus. The Court, through Mr. Justice Black, dismissed the question rather briefly: "It would be wholly unprofitable for us to analyze Illinois cases on the point here urged. It is sufficient for us to say that we think reasonable arguments can be made based on Illinois cases to support a determination of this question either for or against the petitioner's contention. Under these circumstances we will follow our general policy and leave undisturbed this Court of Appeals holding on a question of state law." 7
Mr. Justice Burton asserted that "the weight to which such announcements [of state law] are entitled will vary with the circumstances under which they are made." 31 Since the Justice decided that "by operation of the law of Illinois, there here existed no possibility of a reverter to the settlor" 11 despite the court of appeals' decision that "there was a property interest remaining in the settlor that was terminated only by his death," 41 one might have expected a statement of the "circumstances" which made it appropriate to disregard the view of the court of appeals. But such a statement was not forthcoming. Instead, Mr. Justice Burton said that since the remainders of the settlor's three children were vested rather than contingent, he was not reexamining the court's conclusion because "it made no announcement whatever on the subject of vested remainders." Yet one of the issues of state law decided by the court of appeals was that "the interests under this trust did not vest upon the execution of the trust. the Klei case, 283 U.S. 231 (1931), as authority for this holding, but the excerpt from the Kleh; case which the court was "applying" vas a restatement of Illinois law. Moreover, the court of appeals already only somewhat less explicitly had made evident its viev"
1949]
Mr. Justice Frankfurter was equally unpersuaded by the court of appeals, and advanced a novel proposal:
"It is at best a dubious assumption that such a reverter exists under Illinois law. My brother BURTON'S argument in disproof is not lightly to be dismissed. At best, however, this Court's guess that Illinois law would enforce such a reverter may be displaced the day after tomorrow by the Illinois Supreme Court's authoritative rejection of the guess. If tax liability is to hang by a gossamer thread, the Court ought to be sure that the thread is there. Since only the courts of Illinois can definitively inform us about this, it would seem to me common sense to secure an adjudication from them if some appropriate procedure of Illinois, like the Declaratory Judgment Act, is available. To justify at all the Court's theory, the rational mode of disposing of the case would be to remand it to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in order to allow that court to decide whether in fact a procedure is available under Illinois law for a ruling upon the point of Illinois law which is made the basis of this Court's decision, since the correctness of this Court's assumption is at best doubtful. . . . A determination so made would conclusively fix the interests actually held by the parties to the instrument and at the same time leave to the federal courts the tax consequences of these interests." 42 The Justice did not state whether, if the declaratory judgment procedure was unavailable, he would prefer to dismiss the finding on state law of the court of appeals or the "argument in disproof" of Mr. Justice Burton.
The Supreme Court previously has imposed a self-denying ordinance on the federal courts, requiring them to await an adjudication of state law by the state courts, only in cases involving the constitutionality of state statutes 43 or of state administrative action. 44 In such cases, abstention is thought to reduce state-federal friction and to avoid that the settlor had no reversionary interest because of the contingent nature of the interests of the settlor's three children.
42 Justice Frankfurter dissented, asserting that abstention by the federal judiciary was improper unless "the federal court was practically impotent to enforce state law because of its inability to fathom the complexities, legal or factual, of local law. . . ." 319 U.S.
315,339 (1943).
[Vol. 58: 825 needless constitutional adjudication. Where abstention is not dictated by weighty factors of this type, however, the Court has said that "the difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for decision." -1 To postpone federal judicial action pending clarification of state law by state courts would be a seriously backward step in federal tax administration. State law is relevant to federal liability in innumerable cases, and it would be an unresourceful attorney-in private practice or federal service--who could not find uncertainties in the state decisions in many of these cases.
Presumably a question of state law would have to be in serious doubt to warrant holding up federal litigation pending an authoritative state determination. Yet one need not be a prophet to foresee that an appalling body of litigation, giving rise eventually no doubt to a number of conveniently conflicting "rules," would feed on this one issue. Even if postponement were discretionary with the district or Tax Court judge, presumably some limit to his discretion would be set by the courts of appeals. And they in turn, as well as the Court of Claims, would require instruction from the Supreme Court, which has found great difficulty in deciding when the federal judiciary should withhold its hand even in the grave cases involving injunctions against state agencies., Moreover, the proposal to remit the United States and the taxpayer to the state courts-assuming they will accept the burden 47-overlooks the fact that Congress has provided an elaborate statutory scheme for settling tax disputes, a scheme in which the state courts play no part. 4 3 It overlooks also the explicit injunction against federal declaratory judgments in controversies "iith respect to federal taxes," 49 expressing a policy which is hardly friendly to like actions in the state courts. And it would add the courts of forty-eight more jurisdictions to the already sprawling judicial network which announces federal tax law, for it would be less easy than Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests to: ".. . conclusively fix the interests actually held by the parties to the instrument and at the same time leave to the federal courts the tax consequences of these interests." z Past experience with state court decisions sought solely to "fix the interests actually held by the parties" as a basis for determining federal tax liability does not bode well for the future; all too often, the state court proceedings have been hardly distinguishable from friendly or non-adversary actions. 5 ' Even if the Commissioner were a party to the action, the proceeding would still be colored by the fact that the issue of state law was of importance only to federal tax liability.
The consequences of a reversionary interest arising "by operation of law." Mr. Justice Black made short shrift of the distinction taken by Spiegel's executors between a reversionary interest expressly reserved by the settlor and one arising by "operation of law." He said:
"In either event the settlor has not parted with all of his presently existing or future contingent interests in the property transferred. He has therefore not made that 'complete' kind of trust transfer that § 811(c) commands as a prerequisite to a showing that he has certainly and irrevocably parted with his 'possession or enjoyment.' " s2
The validity of this insistence upon a "complete" transfer will be examined later. 5 3 But one can hardly quarrel with the conclusion that an interest arising "by operation of law" is no less significant than one expressly reserved. Both "types" of reversionary interests are created by the words used in the trust instrument and both are legally effective only "by operation of law," i.e., because a court will attach legal consequences to the words used in the instrument and enforce the grantor's claim. Restated, the distinction is between rights which are conferred by a court because the grantor has used well-chosen words and those which are conferred because the grantor has combined well-chosen words with judicious silence. So restated, the distinction reflects no difference. If the Hallock case carries any lesson, it is that identical legal interests should have identical tax results regardless of the formulas which create them. That case overruled several earlier decisions because in them "a mere difference in phrasing the circumstances by which identic interests in property were brought into being-varying 345 (1949) , the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the settlor of an irrevocable trust could maintain a bill in equity to reform the instrument, so as to eliminate a reversionary interest which was retained only "through the inadvertence and mistake of his scrivener." The bill was brought after and as a result of the Spiegel case. Since, as the Court held, "no interest of any person [other than the settlor-plaintiff], known or unascertained. would be affected by the decree prayed for," it is doubtful that the proceeding could be regarded as an adversary action, 52. 335 U.S. 701, 705 (1949) . 53. Infra, pp. 840-3.
[Vol. 58: 825 forms of words in the creation of the same worldly interests-was found sufficient" to distinguish a tax-free from a taxable transfer. 4 And this is in keeping with judicial refusal, in comparable contexts, to pitch taxability on whether an interest has been acquired by words or by silence.-5 Mr. Justice Burton, in dissent, did not really disagree. He argued only that the lack of an express reservation "was negative evidence to the effect that such a reverter was not intended and not desired by the settlor." 1 It is of course possible that interests created "by operation of law" are ordinarily the result of the draughtsman's failure to provide for every contingency and that interests arising from an express reservation are ordinarily the result of a deliberate desire of the grantor to recapture the property if the stated contingency occurs. This seems to have been the root of the distinction.5 7 But any such "mechanical distinction" 51 points the way to easy evasion; the settlor who wants a reversionary interest can get it by golden silence. Mr. Justice Burton himself confesses that "the existence of such a reverter, accordingly, may or may not have been intended in fact." 11
The role of the decedent's "intent." Assuming with Mr. Justice Burton that the lack of an express reservation is "negative evidence" of the settlor's intent, is his intent of importance? The statute embraces "transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after . . . death." While the courts had never previously laid much stress on the word "intended," 11 Mr. Justice Black in effect read it out of the statute:
"... [T] he taxability of a trust corpus under this provision of § 811(c) does not hinge on a settlor's motives, but depends on the nature and operative effect of the trust transfer. . . . [It is immaterial whether such a present or future interest, absolute or contingent, remains in the grantor because he deliberately reserves it or because, without considering the consequences, he conveys away less than all of his property ownership and attributes, present or prospective. . .. [A] post-death attempt to probe the settlor's thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the effectiveness of the 'possession or enjoyment' provision as an instrument to frustrate estate tax evasions." c, Mr. Justice Burton, dissenting, urged that the corpus should not be included unless "the settlor did actually intend that the 1920 transfer take effect in possession or enjoyment upon the expiration of the trust at his death." 62 He found "uncontroverted and convincing evidence of the absence of any such factual intent on the part of the settlor" 11 in the facts that the trust instrument made no mention of a reversion to the settlor, that the reversionary interest (if there was one) was of trivial value, and that the draughtsman of the instrument testified that the settlor intended to make an absolute gift of the corpus. Mr. Justice Frankfurter did not discuss the question of the settlor's intent. His suggestion that the existence of a reversionary interest be determined by an authoritative state court decision may imply agreement with the majority that such an interest would support the tax regardless of the settlor's intent. The majority is on firm ground in its refusal to conduct a post mortem probe of the settlor's motives. The "contemplation of death" provision has bogged down because its application is tied to a dead man's state of mind.1 4 Whatever the controversies generated by the "possession or enjoyment" provision, at least its application so far has not entailed a similar futile search. To impose a subjective standard upon this part of Section 811 (c) would needlessly convert it into an auxiliary of the ineffectual "contemplation of death" provision.
The remoteness of the settlor's reversionary interest. More troublesome is Mr. Justice Black's view that the corpus is includible no matter how fantastic the possibility of reacquisition. 5 The I-allock principle has 62. Id. at 729. Deliberate retention of a reversionary interest which is extinguished by the settlor's death would stamp the transfer, in Mr. Justice Burton's view, as "intended" to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death. But even without retaining a reversionary interest, the settlor might betray his intent by providing for termination of the trust and distribution of the corpus at death. This would reveal an "intent" to postpone the possession or enjoyment of the remaindermen until that date and the transfer could easily be said to be "intended" to take effect in possession or enjoyment at death. The argument collides, however, with Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., infra, pp. 843-5. Unless that case falls, the choice is between disregarding the settlor's intent with Mr. Justice Black and demanding with Mr. Justice Burton evidence that the settlor "intended" to postpone possession or enjoyment by retaining an interest in the property until death, If the retention is inadvertent, the settlor hardly can be said to have "intended" the transfer to take effect at death except by describing any conduct by a rational person as "intended."
63. been pushed to a "drily logical extreme" 11 when a transfer is taxed because the grantor will recapture the corpus if he outlives his children and grandchildren. In the Spiegel case, the grantor had three children at the time the trust was created; even assuming that they would have no descendants, he then had 17 chances out of 1000 to get the property back; this interest was worth $4,500, based upon a corpus value of more than $1,140,000. Just before his death, the chances had diminished to 16 out of 100,000 and the value of the reversionary interest had sunk to $85. The estate tax cost of this sweepstakes ticket was more than $450,000.67 Of course, there is only a difference in degree between the slim chance of reacquisition in the Spiegel case and the substantial likelihood which justified the tax in the Hallock case. But there is also (in any practical sense, and taxation is an "intensely practical matter") 13 only a difference of degree--and a smaller difference at that-between Spiegel's vain hope of reacquisition and no hope at all. If Spiegel had thrown away his sweepstakes ticket, he would have saved his heirs $450,000. It is inconceivable that he would have retained it with kmowledge of the consequences.
A settlor can achieve this estate tax saving by guarding against a reversionary interest when the trust is created; and it is possible that carelessness at the outset can be corrected by relinquishing the reversionary interest when its existence is discovered.c The gift tax cost "correctly" held to be within Section 811(c). A clause in the Spiegel trust instrument could have provided specifically that the remainder interest of any child predeceasing the settlor should pass to the other beneficiaries surviving him or, if no beneficiary survived him, to his estate. This would have supplied a firm foundation for the argument of the executors, note 33 supra, that the settlor could then take only if he were the legatee or next of kin of the predeceasing child. The possibility of recapturing the corpus in this event, dependent as it is upon the child's failure to name a legatee other than the settlor, hardly could be thought to brand the trust as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. See Estate of Houghton, 2 T.C. 871 (1943) . In Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 637 (1945), the Court held taxable the proceeds of insurance because the decedent had retained a reversionary interest for his estate, though his interest could have been cut off by the beneficiary, who had the right to assign or surrender the policy. But the sacrifice of potential value which results from the surrender of an unmatured policy would serve to deter such action by the beneficiary (cf. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254 (1941)). Conequently an opportunity to receive the proceeds of insurance if the beneficiary fails to sur-of an original final gift over or of a later relinquishment would be trivial. 0 The simple fact is that the Hallock rule, unexceptionable as applied to transfers involving a reasonable likelihood of reacquisition, will often be a tax on bad draughtsmanship. In fact, the niceties of conveyancing being what they are, even a careful draughtsman may find that he has not provided for every contingency because a remainder is less vested than he thought or because he has overlooked some other ancient loophole equally unrelated to the policy of the taxing statute.
It now appears that the "unwitty diversities" and "elusive and subtle casuistries" of the law of property were not deported from the law of taxation by the Hallock case. They were rather elevated to new heights.
Draughtsmen will have to study, as never before, the sacred books of Fearne, Gray, and Leake for the incantations which exorcise reversionary interests. The Government, for its part, will worship at the shrine of Contingent Remainder, Worthier Title, Condition of Survivorship, and similar tribal deities. The more tax-conscious the grantor, the more likely his success in propitiating these deities before his death. Only the naive and unsophisticated need be sacrificed. This is not to say that the author agrees with current proposals to tax only the actuarial value (just before death) of the settlor's reverrender or assign the policy is not comparable to an opportunity to obtain the corpus of a trust if the remainderman does not dispose of it by will. See also PAuL, FEDmAL EsTATE: AND G=~r TAxAT N § 7.23 (1946 Supp.), and Looker, supra note 12, for other methods of eliminating reversionary interests. Another route to avoidance of the Spiegcl decision has been attempted by the Minnesota legislature. A statute, approved on March 26, 1949, provides that under stated circumstances reversionary interests not intended by the settlor shall be held for the State rather than for the persons otherwise entitled to them. The statute, Chapter 201, Minnesota Laws of 1949, applies "if by the terms of the controlling trust instrument the settlor manifested irrevocably his intention to divest himself of all interest" in the property or "expressly and irrevocably surrendered the right to revoke the trust and the right to make the settlor or the estate of the settlor a beneficiary" of the property. If either of these conditions is met, any interest which otherwise "would be recognized in the settlor of the trust or the estate of the settlor or the heirs at law of the settlor as such .. shall be deemed to be held upon a resulting trust for the State of Minnesota." C.C.H. FED. ESTATE AND Gin-r TAx REP., Report Letter No. 6, p. 2 (April 5, 1949). Thus an tinsuccessful attempt to make a complete gift to named beneficiaries may effect a gift to the state. Undoubtedly constitutional objections will be advanced against the statute.
70. The amount of the gift would be the actuarial value of the reversionary interest disposed of. See Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943). It might be impossible to calculate the value of the reversionary interest separately from the value of the remainder. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943) . This problem would be troublesome if a reversionary interest, retained at the time of the original transfer, was relinquished in response to the Hallock or Spiegel case. Even then, if a gift tax had been paid on creation on the combined values of the inseparable reversionary and remainder interests, presumably no additional tax would be payable when the reversion was relinquished. But query, if the rates, exclusions, or specific exemption had changed. A relinquishment for the sole purpose of avoiding estate tax no doubt would be a transfer in contemplation of death. But the value to be included is veiled in mystery; cf. the related problem discussed in note 165 infra.
[Vol. 58 -825 sionary interest. 7 ' Where the settlor has retained a real chance to recapture the corpus, as in the Hallock case, the tax should embrace the value of both the reversionary and the remainder interest. Both are in suspense until the settlor's death. The Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. and Field cases 7 2 settle the issue in a way that is consonant with both the function and the language of the statute. If the settlor retains a life estate, the tax is levied not on the value of that estate just before the settlor's death, but rather on the value of the corpus which for the first time is directly enjoyed by the remainderman.
Where the settlor has a substantial reversionary interest, there is an at least comparable improvement in the remainderman's status. And it is therefore equally appropriate to tax the corpus.
The remedy for the Spiegel absurdity is not legislation to destroy the Hallock rule. It is rather to treat reversionary interests of insignificant value as de minimisY 3 In a related area, the Treasury itself has ruled that certain types of events may be disregarded in determining liability under Section 811(c) if they are "unreal." 74 This judgment must be made in connection with the provision in T.D. 5512, the "Hallock regulation," that a transfer is not taxable if the beneficiaries need not survive the grantor to obtain possession or enjoyment of the transferred property. 7 5 The regulation states:
"Where possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be obtained by beneficiaries either by surviving the decedent or through the occurrence of some other event or through the exercise of a power, subparagraph (1) [limiting the tax to transfers where possession or enjoyment can be obtained only by beneficiaries who must survive the decedent] shall not be considered as satisfied unless from a consideration of the terms and circumstances of the transfer as a whole, the power or event is deemed to be unreal, in which case such event or power shall be disregarded."
Thus if a named beneficiary may obtain the property either by surviving the grantor or by exercising an unrestricted power of appointment, the transfer would not be taxable. 7 
75.
The regulation establishes two criteria of taxability, both of which must be met: the survivorship requirement described here, and the retention by the decedent of an interest in the transferred property, infra, p. 843.
U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17, Example (8).
restricted power is a real possibility, the transfer is not one under which, as a practical matter, the beneficiary must survive the grantor to obtain possession or enjoyment of the property. If, however, the beneficiary could obtain possession or enjoyment either by surviving the grantor or by surviving his own descendants, the transfer probably would be taxable. For the road to enjoyment via surviving one's own descendants is "unreal," and the only practicable route for the beneficiary would be to survive the grantor. If the Bureau of Internal Revenue can draw a line between "real" and "unreal" events for this purpose, it should be equally able to decide what reversionary interests are so remote as to be ignored.
The Court has said that the Hallock and Spiegel reversionary interests fall in the same category and that both are fundamentally different from transfers where no interest remains in the grantor. The rule sacrifices sense to certainty. To classify Spiegel interests with complete transfers, distinguishing both from I-allock interests, would have been to give up certainty for the always tantalizing search for sense. It would not have been an impossible task of judicial administration. The courts could have been assisted by a Treasury administrative ruling that a reversionary interest worth, for example, less than 5% of the corpus should be ignored."
Are all reversionary interests embraced by Section 8zi(c)?
In the Spiegel case, the transferor would regain the corpus if he survived his children and grandchildren; if he predeceased any of them, his reversionary interest was extinguished. In this respect, the case resembled the Hallock case, where the corpus would have returned to the grantor only if he survived his wife. The possession or enjoyment of the remaindermen of such trusts is assured only by the settlor's predecease; until then, their expectation of "coming into" the property may be disappointed by their predecease.
But what of the manifold situations where, though the settlor possesses a reversionary interest, his death is not a date of consequence to the remaindermen? To take an example from T.D. 5512, the so-called Hallock regulation:
"The decedent, during his life, transferred property in trust, giving the income therefrom to his son for life and the remainder to his son's surviving issue. If no issue survived the life tenant, the property was to revert to the decedent or his estate." The significant feature of this transfer is that possession or enjoyment of the corpus may pass to the remaindermen during the transferor's life. This distinguishes the trust from the Spiegel and Itallock trusts, where so long as the settlor lived the remaindermen could never be certain of possessing or enjoying the corpus. Conversely, from the point of view of the transferor, the contingency upon which the property (in the example) will return to him is not (as in the Spiegel and Hallock cases) his survivorship of the remaindermen. Whether he survives his son or not, the property will revert (to him or to his estate) if his son dies without issue. This event may occur before, at, or after, his death.
Is such a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the settlor's death?
Though the Hallock case had induced a myopic fascination with reversionary interests per se, the Treasury Regulations say that a trust of this type is not taxable. 79 The decedent retained a reversionary interest, but it was not necessary for the remaindermen to survive him to obtain possession or enjoyment of the propert3. The Regulations insist that the transfer is not taxable unless such a condition of survivorship is imposed upon the beneficiaries. "The establishment of this factor as an additional requirement for taxabilit3, is the principal contribution of T.D. 5512." so What is the bearing of the Spiegel case on transfers of this type? The Spiegel facts, as has been noted, did not require a decision on the issue. But the Supreme Court is not easily "cabin'd, cribb'd, confined." Mr. Justice Black said:
"In the Church case we stated that a trust transaction cannot be held to alienate all of a settlor's 'possession or enjoyment' under § 811(c) unless it effects 'a bona fide transfer in which the settlor, absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations, parts with all of his title and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred property. After such a transfer has been made, the settlor must be left with no present legal title in the property, no possible reversionary interest in that title, and no right to possess or enjoy the property then or thereafter. In other words, such a transfer must be immediate and out and out, and must be unaffected by whether the grantor lives or dies.' "3 79. U.S. Treas Although the transfers which we are now considering are "unaffected by whether the grantor lives or dies," they do leave the grantor with a "possible reversionary interest" and in that sense they are not "out and out." It would seem to follow from the Justice's almost exasperated insistence upon the necessity for a clean break that the transfers are includible. This conclusion is reinforced by the Justice's reference to:
"... that 'complete' kind of transfer that § 811(c) commands as a prerequisite to a showing that [the transferor] has certainly and irrevocably parted with his 'possession or enjoyment.' " 1
Of course if the transferor has a reversionary interest of any type, lie has not "certainly and irrevocably parted with his 'possession or enjoyment.' " But the statute purports to tax not all "incomplete" transfers but only those which become complete at or after the settlor's death. Somewhat later Mr. Justice Black says, with reference to the exemption urged on the ground of the retained interest's slight value:
"The question is not how much is the value of a reservation, but whether after a trust transfer, considered by Congress to be a potentially dangerous tax evasion transaction, some present or contingent right or interest in the property still remains in the At this point Mr. Justice Black appears to agree with the Treasury that the only relevance of a reversionary interest is that it may be a method by which "full and complete title, possession or enjoyment" is withheld from the beneficiaries until at or after the settlor's death. But elsewhere, as in the other portions of his opinion quoted above, he regards any reversionary interest as fair game for Section 811 (c).
One cannot escape the conviction that today's Court is as unwilling as was yesterday's to stick to the statute and statutory purpose. If the earlier Court was bemused by the concept of title, the later one is bemused by the concepts of reversionary interest and of "complete" transfers and by the metaphor of "strings." This is not to say that the exchange of new shibboleths for old may not be a step forward. But even the new are not to be found in the statute, nor do they spring from extensive concern with the statutory purpose. The only significance of a retention by the grantor of a "reversionary interest" or other "string" or of his failure to make a "complete" transfer is that these may be devices to prevent the transfer from taking effect in pos-82. Ibid..
Id. at 707 (italics added).
[Vol. 58: 825 session or enjoyment until at or after his death. But if the grantor's retention of a "reversionary interest" or "string" or his failure to make a "complete" transfer are not devices to this end, Section 811(c) is not applicable. The Treasury Regulations hew more closely to the statute than do the dicta of the Supreme Court.
Is a rezzersionary interest vecessary? One more issue demands exploration. Spiegel's trust was to terminate upon his death. Even if he had retained no reversionary interest to be cut off by his death, then, that date was of importance to the beneficiaries. Not until then would the corpus be distributed. Moreover, any child who was not alive on that date forfeited his third of the corpus; it would go instead to the deceased child's surviving children, if any, and otherwise to the settlor's other children or their descendants. Was the transfer, by virtue of these facts alone, intended by the settlor "to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death?"
In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.," 4 the Court had faced the same question, viz., whether "the mere passing of possession or enjoyment of the trust fund from the life tenants to the remaindermen after the testator's death, as directed" was a taxable transfer. 8 Thinking that a tax would be "incongruous" and that it was "at least doubtful" that the statute was intended to comprehend property not "passing from the possession, enjoyment or control of the donor at his death," the court decided to resolve the doubt in favor of the taxpayer and thereby to avoid any constitutional question. Although later Courts have developed an immunity to the constitutional "doubts" which afflicted the Reinecke v. Nortlern Trust Co. Courtp the case has never been overruled, and the Treasury Regulations have meticulously conformed to it.S7 In directing reargument in the Spiegel and Church cases, however, the Court invited a discussion of its validity.l
The Government argued that Rehnecke v. N¥orthern Trust Co. was wrongly decided. In its view a trust which terminates upon the settlor's death is "a substitute for a testamentary disposition" and is both 84. 278 U.S. 339 (1929) . 85. One of the Reinecke v. Northen Trust Co. trusts provided, as did the Spicgcl trust, that if a remainderman died before termination of the trust, his share of the corpus would go not to his estate but to his surviving issue or to the settlor's issue. Transcript of Record, p. 6, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929) . The other four trusts provided that the share of such a predeceasing remainderman would go as he appointed by will or, in default of appointment, to his or the settlor's surviving issue. Id. at 20, 23, 35, 43. The date of the testator's death is more crucial to the remaindermen under the first trust than under the other four; in the latter cases the corpus will be paid to the remainderman only if he survives that date, but he enjoys the power to route the corpus as he desires even though he may not survive.
86. Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938) ; see Eisenstein, supra note 5, at 497-500.
87. See note 75 supra.
88. 68 S. Ct. 1522 Ct. , 1524 Ct. (1948 .
literally and in principle a transfer "intended 'to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death.' " 9 On the oral argument counsel for the Government urged also that there is no difference in principle between a trust in which the settlor has retained a reversionary interest of "trivial" value and one in which he reserved no interest at all. 9 " Spiegel's executors asserted that Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. was correctly decided because the federal estate tax, unlike state inheritance taxes, is upon the "transfer of property from the dead" and not upon the "succession to property by a beneficiary." They also urged that the decision had been confirmed by Congress and by other decisions of the Supreme Court. 9 Since the Court decided to accept the determination by the court of appeals that Spiegel had retained a reversionary interest in the trust corpus, it found no need to answer the question which it directed counsel to illuminate. In fact, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. is mentioned by Mr. Justice Black only in a footnote. 9 2 But he does say in both the Church and the Spiegel cases that a transfer to be exempt under Section 811 (c) :
".... must be immediate and out and out, and must be unaffected by whether the grantor lives or dies." 91 This statement suggests that even if a transfer is "immediate and out and out" because the settlor has relinquished all his rights to the property, it may nevertheless be taxable if it is "affected" by the grantor's death. Then a trust would be taxable merely because it was to terminate upon the grantor's death. If this is the meaning of Mr. Justice Black's language, Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co. has been overruled sub silentio by the Court.
Viewed in its context, however, the Justice's language may be less sweeping than it appears at first glance. He goes on to say that his prerequisites to a tax-free transfer were "declared . . . to be the effect of the Hallock case in Goldstone v. United States." 91 In both, the settlor had retained a reversionary interest which was extinguished by his death. 95 but if the Court intended to do so, it adopted a curious way to convey the message. The proposed amendments to the Treasury Regulations, announced as this goes to press, preserve as a condition of taxability the requirement that the decedent have possessed some right or interest in the property." Reinecke v. iortkern Trust Co. thus lives on.
The place of the gift tax. It is curious that none of the opinions so much as mentions the existence of the federal gift tax. It happens that the Spiegel trust was created in 1920, before the enactment of the federal gift tax statute; if the trust had not been brought under the estate tax, the transfer would have escaped tax altogether. Aside from this circumstance, which will be of diminishing frequency in the future, the real issue is whether such a trust shall be taxed as an inter vihos or as a testamentary transfer. If the former, it will be subjected only to federal gift tax. If the latter, a gift tax will have to be paid, but in addition the transfer will be embraced by the estate tax, against which the gift tax will be credited as a "down payment." ", Because the gift tax is assessed at lower rates and affords a separate set of exemptions and exclusions, the transfer which is reached only by it escapes more cheaply than the transfer which falls under both taxes. The Supreme Court's emphasis upon "complete" transfers may reflect a view that the gift tax is so ineffective for these reasons that transfers should be brought under the estate tax whenever possible. Were it not for the lower rates and separate exemption and exclusions of the gift tax, it would be of little importance whether the transfer were taxed as an inter vivos or as a testamentary gift.
An integrated transfer tax-one way to avoid the overlapping which results from the existing dual system of estate and gift taxes-would be imposed only once. It would still be necessary to decide whether a Spiegel transfer was taxable when the trust was created or only when the settlor died. Though this would not be a matter of complete indifference to the taxpayer, it would be far less important than at present." The integration proposal recently advanced by an advisory committee of tax specialists in conjunction with Treasury officials provides for a tax on the Spiegel and Hallock type transfer at death: 98. Under an integrated transfer tax, the rates would be the same whether the transfer 'was taxed when made or not until the transferor's death. Unless there were an al-"A disposition of this type suspends the eventual disposition of the property until the transferor's death and is, therefore, akin to, as well as a substitute for, a testamentary disposition." 11
III. THE CHURCH CASE
The facts. The Church trust (created in 1924), unlike the Spiegel trust, reserved the income to the settlor for life. On his death, the corpus was to be distributed to his surviving issue; if no issue survived him, the corpus was to go to his surviving brothers and sisters, the children of any deceased brother or sister to take their parent's share per stirpes. There was no express requirement that the children of deceased brothers and sisters (i.e., the settlor's nieces and nephews) survive the settlor to take. If such a condition was implicit, however, the settlor had a reversionary interest "by operation of law," as in the Spiegel case, since he made no provision for alternate takers if not only his brothers and sisters, but also his nieces and nephews predeceased him. If, however, the nieces and nephews were not required to survive the settlor, then the share of those who predeceased him would pass to their legatees or next of kin. When the trust was created the settlor (who was unmarried) had six brothers and sisters and seven nieces and nephews; the value of his reversionary interest, if he had one, is not given. At the time of his death, he had no children of his own; he was survived by his six brothers and sisters and by ten nieces and nephews. The value, immediately before his death, of an opportunity to reacquire the corpus of $188,800, by surviving the sixteen beneficiaries then living, was less than $0.0003.11°T
he Tax Court held that the settlor had a reversionary interest by operation of law but that such an interest was not within the lIallock doctrine.'' The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, one judge dissenting, affirmed'on the Dobson principle, being unable to "identify a clearcut mistake of law." 102 Whereas the court of appeals in the lowance for interest, it would be advantageous to postpone liability until death. But a counterbalancing factor would be the fact that the tax paid during life would reduce the estate subject to tax at death. (1) May a court of appeals reexamine the Tax Court's determination of the law of a state outside the appellate court's orbit? 101 In the Spiegel case the Tax Court held that the decedent "retained 'no string or tie' amounting to a possibility of reversion." 105 The court of appeals decided to the contrary.' Mr. Justice Black sanctioned the independent determination of state law by the court of appeals and refused to reexamine it. The Spiegel trust was governed by Illinois law and the question of tax liability came before judges whose circuit includes Illinois and "who are constantly required to pass upon Illinois law questions." 107 But the Church trust was governed by New York law and the tax question was presented to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, whose jurisdiction does not extend to New York.
(2) If the court of appeals in the Church case was entitled to make its own determination of state law, on the ground that it was as competent to decide New York law as the Tax Court, would the Supreme Court defer to its determination in the same manner as in the Spiegel case it deferred to a determination by a court of appeals which included the state whose law was controlling?
Instead of merely refining the learning of the Spiegel case, however, the Supreme Court turned the Church case into a vehicle for overruling quires it to consider both law and facts. Whatever latitude exists in resolving questions such as those of proper accounting. . . exists in the Tax Court and not in the regular courts; when the court cannot separate the elements of a decision so as to identify a clearcut mistake of law, the decision of the Tax Court must stand." That the Dotson: rule resulted in greater finality for the decisions of the Tax Court than for those Heiner that retention of possession or enjoyment of his property was not enough to require inclusion of its value in the gross estate if a trust grantor had succeeded in passing bare legal title out of himself before death." 114 Of course, in May v. Heiner the settlor had "succeeded" in disposing of more than "bare legal title." She had not merely transferred ".bare legal title" to a trustee, but had created remainder interests in the corpus as well. And unlike the Hallock remainder, the May remainder interests were not contingent upon the predecease of the grantor. The necessary reach of the Hallock case was any transfer under which the named remainderman must survive the settlor or forfeit the property. Nor was the language of the Hallock case, though sweeping, in necessary conflict with lay v. Heiner. For the purpose of the Hallock Court in using that language was to bring harmony into the welter of decisions concerned with trusts in which the settlor had retained a reversionary interest. The Klein case, decided in 1931, had held such trusts taxable because "the death of the grantor was the indispensable and intended event which brought the larger estate into being for the grantee and effected its transmission from the dead to the living." "I Then the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases "I had introduced distinctions based on the common law of real property by which trusts resulting in identical reversionary interests would be taxed or immune depending upon the "varying forms of words" 117 used in the trust instruments. Heiner, which preceded it by a year, and with the St. Louis Union Trust Co. cases, which followed it by a few years, only on the theory that "the Klcin decision hinged on the circumstance that a contingent remainder became a vested remainder." Eisenstein, sura note 5, at 452. This would lead, if I understand him correctly, to the conclusion that the Klcin case ignored "the niceties of the art of conveyancing" only to a very limited e.tent, if at all. It leads also to the conclusion that Mr. Justice Sutherland's description of the grantors death as "the indispensable and intended event which brought the larger estate into being for the grantee" was not intended to have the consequences attributed to it by Air. Justice Frankfurter in the Hallock case. From this view of the Klein case it is argued that Hallock is a new departure, fundamentally incompatible with May v. Heincr. It seems to follow that, if in the Hallock case Mr. Justice Frankfurter gave too much credit to Mir. Justice Sutherland, in his dissent in the Church case he gives too little credit to his o,m opinion in the Hallock case. I remain unpersuaded that the "dismal distinction," note 119 infra, is not a more likely, albeit less ingenious, explanation of w.,hat both Mir. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice Frankfurter were up to in the Klein and Halloc cases. It has the merit, at least, of taking them both at their word. In any event, the inquiry is now an all but profitless one, except as indicating that after the Halloch case there was real doubt of the continued vitality of May v. Heiner. This in turn sheds light on the reasonableness of reliance upon that decision. See pp. 859-60 in!ra.
119. Though the May v. Heincr beneficiaries had to await the settlor's death to "come into" the property, they or their estates-unlike the Klein, St. Lois U[nion Trust Co., and Hallock beneficiaries-were certain of ultimate enjoyment. Something more than "niceties of the art of conveyancing" marked the difference. To the effect that this is a "dismal dis-1949] that the Klein case (to which the Iallock case announced a return) was decided in April, 1931, a year after May v. Heiner and only a month after it was reaffirmed by the three per curiam opinions. Presumably the Court, in deciding the Klein case unanimously, thought the holding consistent with the four cases decided, also unanimously, just a short time before.
But the doctrine of iMfay v. Heiner, whether it was undermined by Hallock or not, always rested upon the flimsiest of underpinnings. As Mr. Justice Black points out, transfers with reserved life estates consistently had been held to be embraced by the "possession or enjoyment" clause of state death tax statutes, from which in 1916 the federal statute had borrowed the clause. 2 
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Heiner as to pre-1931 transfers. Does it follow that Congress endorsed the decision so that, as to such transfers, it became (in the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter) "as much a part of the wording of the statute as if it had been written in express terms"? 131 It must not be forgotten that on March 3, 1931, Congress lad only one day left before its scheduled adjournment. At such a time a proposal to tax transfers which hitherto had been thought immune could not have gained a hearing. The speedy action of Congress and the debate on the floor unequivocally demonstrate its conviction that the Court had distorted the meaning of the statute. It is hard to believe that by repudiating such a decision for the future, Congress was barring reexamination by the Court as to the past.
Moreover, there is a more rational explanation of Congress' nonretroactive action than the dubious theory that it was enacting into law a doctrine of which it so emphatically disapproved. In Burnet T. Northern Trust Co., as in its two companion cases, the Supreme Court had significantly said that there was "no question of the constitutional authority of the Congress to impose prospectively a tax with respect to transfers or trusts of the sort here involved." 132 With such an advisory opinion by the Supreme Court, prospective action by Congress was certainly the better part of valor. The Court's remark also sheds light on the statement in the House of Representatives by Mr. Gamer, one of the sponsors of the Resolution:
"We did not make it retroactive for the reason that we were afraid the Senate would not agree to it." 113 Why did he entertain fears that the Senate would not agree to retroactive action? The rapid and unanimous action of the Senate-where the Supreme Court's construction of the existing statute was described as a "bombshell" ' 3 4 --shows unmistakably that the Senate was no more friendly to the Court's view than was the House. It is a further legislation. This construction of the statute was based upon Section 302(h), now Section 811(h), which had provided since 1926 that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided" transfers were ta-able "whether made... before or after" the enactment of this Act. Because of this provision, the Court in deciding Hasselt v. Vclfh said that "the meaning of the section [811 (c)] is not so free from doubt as to preclude inquiry concerning the legislative purpose" and also found "sufficient ambiguity to warrant" resort to several canons of construction. Id. at 309, 314. As redrafted and unanimously adopted by the Council of the Committee, the Board of Governors of the Association, and the House of Delegates of the Association, the resolution is as follows:
"RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association recommends to the Congress that it make clear that its purpose in enacting the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931 (46 STAT. 1516) was to provide that the Joint Resolution should apply only to transfers made after its enactment, and that as to any transfer made prior to March 3, 1931, the mere retention by the transferor of a life estate shall not in itself cause the transfer to be taxable (Vol. 58: 25 dissenting opinions in the Church case will be the springboard for this recommendation to Congress. Moreover, as this article goes to press, the Commissioner has proposed to amend the Regulations to provide that the doctrine of the Church case will not be applied to estates whose decedents died on or before January 17, 1949, the date of the decision.'4 These proposals for administrative and legislative action should evoke a critical analysis of the extent to which there may have been reasonable reliance upon "the doctrine of Lay v. Heiner." 1 Until M1,ay v. Heiner was decided, of course, no well-advised taxpayer would have thought that property transferred with life estate reserved was beyond the reach of the federal estate tax. So far as pre-1930 legal thought was concerned, if the phrase "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death" included anything, it included such transfers. 15 It may be that some students of the Supreme Court predicted the outcome in M1ay v. Heiner-certainly taxpayers were litigating the issue-5 ' but anyone who relied on such a prediction was gambling rather than indulging "reasonable expectations" of the kind which may be entitled to public protection.
How did the decision in Presumably the answer is that the tax price went up, 1 " 2 while the actuarial value of the life estate to the settlor was going down. The estate tax rates have risen substantially since May v. HUeiner was decided, and a liability that was viewed with equanimity in 1920 may have mounted to an alarming degree since then. 5 3 Yet it would be fatuous to assume that an increase in potential estate tax liability would inevitably have been followed by a relinquishment of the life estate. In some cases the income may have been the settlor's chief or only means of support. Moreover, whether the income was essential or not, many settlors of such trusts must have foreseen an increase in liability as their estates increased in value during the late twenties. The failure to relinquish the life estate at that time demonstrates that not every increase in estate tax makes retention of a life estate too expensive. And the spectacular increases in income tax rates in the last two decades were surely a goad to tax-conscious grantors to relinquish life estates so the income would be taxed to others, almost invariably in lower tax brackets. If soaring income tax rates did not result in relinquishment, why assume that increased estate tax liability would have turned the trick?
These doubts arise because taxpayers are not calculating machines but human beings; every tax action is not accompanied by an equal and opposite taxpayer reaction. Despite these doubts, however, let us assume with the dissenters in the Church case that at least some settlors who thought a reserved life estate worth the price before 1930 would not have thought so thereafter and that, except for May v. Heiner, they would have relinquished the life estate in order to escape the tax liability.
We must still ask: was it reasonable to refrain from relinquishing a life estate in reliance upon May v. Heiner? Unless the reliance was 152. Brief for Neeves & Durbin as Amici Curiae on Certain Limited Points, p. 14, Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 335 U.S. 632 (1949) : "Assuming that the settlor in legal contemplation assumed the risk of the tax, the estate tax in the 1920's was only a token tax by present standards and was used principally to induce the states to adopt inheritance tax statutes. The rates were trivial by present standards. The size of the tax as well ag its philosophy was so changed in the 1930's as to make it in effect a new tax designed to take for the Government the greater part of substantial estates and a large part of modest ones. Settlors in the 1920's were not on notice and could not have expected the enactment of such a new tax and its application to their transfers."
153. Actually, of course, the tax liability depends on the vicissitudes of the settlor's fortune as well as on the tax rate. The liability may have decreased despite the increases in rates.
[Vol. The likelihood that many persons would have taken such action is diminished by two additional facts of importance. First, the relinquishment would have been a taxable gift. The grantor would have had to weigh the ultimate estate tax saving against the immediate gift tax liability. It must be assumed that the gift tax liability would have been a restraining influence of some weight. We know that the extent to which taxpayers make inter vivos gifts and thereby reduce their estate tax liability is far less than mathematics alone would dictate. 164 Second, since by hypothesis the sole motivation for a relinquishment of the type we are considering is the avoidance of estate tax on the corpus, the relinquishment would be a gift in contemplation of death. A literal application of these words would result in no tax, since the life estate is extinguished by the decedent's death. (Note that interests retained by the decedent which lapse upon death are not included in the gross estate.) The phrase "at the time of his death" might be construed to mean "immediately before his death," in which event the includible value of the life estate would be computed with regard to the decedent's life expectancy at that time. On either theory other types of property of limited life, such as copyrights, patents, leases, oil royalties, etc., would be taxed, if at all, at values below their worth at the time of transfer. The other extreme would be to tax the entire corpus, the life estate in which was released in contemplation of death. This procedure finds some support in the theory that the tax is to be computed "as if" the transfer had not occurred, Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1935), see Note, 58 YAmm L.J. 313 (1949) . But it is one thing to hold that the transfer is to be disregarded so as to treat the transferred interest as though it had been retained until death, thus permitting fluctuations in the value of the transferred property to be reflected in the gross estate. It is quite another thing to say that the transfer is to be ignored in order to treat other property as though the interest transferred in contemplation of death had been retained. But ef. Estate of Sullivan, 10 T.C. 961 (1948), 37 CA~i.. L. Rnv. 134 (1949) . Section 811(j) suggests a pozsible though perhaps illogical way out of the dilemma: take into account all fluctuations in the value of the transferred interest between the date of transfer and the date of death ex'cept those resulting from mere lapse of time. Thus on the release of a life estate, the value to In Allen v. Trust Company of Georgia, 16 the Supreme Court held that the relinquishment of a power to amend a trust (the retention of which would have brought the corpus into the settlor's taxable estate) in order to avoid the estate tax was not a gift in contemplation of death. But there the purpose of the original transfers in trust was to take care of the beneficiaries "come what may," "by giving them property, freed of all claims, tax or otherwise." This purpose would have been thwarted if the corpus was included in the grantor's estate and subjected to the estate tax lien. The original transfer had been thought by the settlor to achieve this purpose-a reasonable expectation later proved incorrect by the Supreme Court-107 and the subsequent relinquishment was intended by the grantor "to put the trusts in the condition he had thought they were in when he made them."
But the.Georgia Trust Co. case would be cold comfort to a settlor who had created a trust before 1931, retaining the income for life. Since he was willing to court an estate tax at the time of the original transfer, a later relinquishment of the life estate would not be designed to insure the success of an original plan of providing the beneficiaries with assets free of any possible tax claims. In relinquishing his retained rights, such a grantor, unlike the testator in the Georgia Trust Co. case, would not be endeavoring "merely to accomplish by an additional step what he assumed he had already done." ,,a The relinquishment of a life estate, therefore, would have constituted a gift in contemplation of death. This reduces still further the likelihood that a settlor would have relinquished-but for May v. Heiner-his life estate.
For these reasons, the Treasury's proposal lOS to jettison the Church case for decedents who died before January 17, 1949 is unwise. The case for "relief" is yet to be established. It is true that many estates which enjoyed the benefits of May v. Heiner have been closed, and that similar benefits would be denied to "those that are still open merely because of the' fortuitous circumstance that the settlor in estates now open deferred his death [!] until the last few years and after Hallock be included in the gross estate would be the actuarial value at the date of release, with adjustments for changes in the earning power of the property between that date and the date of death. In any event, the uncertainties of this question of valuation cast doubt on the glib assertion that settlors would have hastened to relinquish life estates had it not been for May v. Heiner. And the valuation question is no more uncertain now than in earlier years.
166. 326 U.S. 630 (1946 In any event, the assertion that there would have been a tax-free release before 1932 calls only for relief from the imposition of gift tax: upon a release of the life estate. Such relief would restore the settlor to his 1930 or 1931 position. But relief from thegift taxisnot really of importance. A release will be a gift in contemplation of death resulting in an increased estate tax,' 7 ' against which a gift tax paid will be credited as a "dowrn payment. 170. Though the gift tax paid may be credited against the estate tax ultimately payable, the credit may not be the full amount of the gift tax, and since there is no allovance for interest the decedent will have been deprived of the use of the money during his life.
171. ".. . including a transfer under which the transferor has retained for his life or any period not ending before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property or (2) the right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom . . . "
The circumstances of the Joint Resolution's adoption by Congress demonstrate, as urged above, 1 76 that it embraced only those transfers which Congress had thought were already included in the "possession or enjoyment" clause. The legislative committees later said that "the joint resolution was designed to avoid the effect of decisions of the Supreme Court . . ." '7 The proliferation of language in the Joint Resolution, then, was a response to the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to harken to simple phraseology, not an attempt to say something new. It follows that a type of transfer which would be comprehended by the Joint Resolution if made after 1931, would be reached by the original "possession or enjoyment" clause, if made before 1931.
In the Joint Resolution Congress specified that a retention of the right to designate the recipient of income should have the same tax price as a retention of the income. This, it would seem, was only a statement of the obvious: the economic position of one who can name the income beneficiary is all but indistinguishable from the position of one who has reserved the income to himself. Specification in the Joint Resolution of this fact of life confirms-rather than deniesthat the pre-1931 statute reached a reservation of the power to designate.
Yet the issue is not one of first impression. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has said that "it is clear that a pre-1931 reserved power to designate who should enjoy the income was not sufficient to throw the entire corpus into the gross estate." 178 The court is correct, but only because such a power was regarded as in the same category as the reserved life estate and hence governed by May v. Heiner.'" Although two of the three cases " 0 which shocked Congress into passing the Joint Resolution involved reserved life estates, the third 181 involved a reserved power to designate the income beneficiary. The Treasury Department, Supreme Court, and Congress treated the three cases as involving the same principle, further evidence that a power to designate the recipient of income is in substance the same as a reserved life estate. 182 The other differences in phraseology between the "possession or enjoyment" clause and the Joint Resolution are more minor. The Joint Resolution applies to a retention by the settlor "for his life or any period not ending before his death." 1s1 It also applies to a reservation of "the possession or enjoyment of, or the income from, the property." But since the Joint Resolution was intended to correct a misinterpretation of an existing statute, not to reach out to transfers hitherto thought immune, these phrases are no broader in scope than the pre-1931 statute. With the overruling of May v. Heiner, the "possession or enjoyment" clause is sufficient to reach all transfers comprehended by the Joint Resolution. bring the corpus into the gross estate, a reserved power to designate the income beneficiary is equally ineffective. Neither opinion intimated that a power to designate the income beneficiary would be exempt if a reserved life estate resulted in tax.
180. See note 30 supra. 181. McCormickv. Burnet, 283 U.S. 784 (1931). 182. What of a power to designate only within a restricted class? The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has refused in a persuasive passage to distinguish a power to designate within a restricted class from an unrestricted power to designate: "It would be a relatively simple matter to put in the instrument a list of persons which would cover practically anyone that the decedent might ever wish to designate." Industrial Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 1947). This consideration would seem also to bar a distinction between a life estate and a restricted power to designate.
183. If a youthful settlor reserved the income for five years and died within the period, the reservation would fit the literal requirement of the statute: ". . . a transfer . . . for .. any period not ending before his death." But the Regulations reach only a transfer for life or "for such a period as to evidence [the decedent's] intention that it should extend at least for the duration of his life and his death occurs before the expiration of such period." U.S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18(a) ; see also id., § 81.19(a). The settlor, then, must intend his reserved right to be effective at least throughout his life.
184. 14 FED. REa. 1824 REa. (1949 .
[Vol, 58:z825 possession or enjoyment of the property or a right to the income therefrom."'But the Regulations continue to provide in separate sections that post-1931 transfers will be taxed if the settlor retained either "the use, possession, right to the income, or other enjoyment of the transferred property" Is' or "the right . . . to designate the person or persons who shall possess or enjoy the transferred property, or the income thereof." 16 Do the proposed amendments mean that pre-1931 transfers will not be taxed if the settlor has retained only the right to designate the income beneficiary? There remain for consideration the changes in Section 811 (c) wrought by the 1932 amendment,s 7 which replaced the Joint Resolution. This amendment taxes property of which the decedent: "... has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his death (1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income, from the property, or (2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom."
To the extent that the 1932 amendment was declaratory, its scope is prefigured by the Joint Resolution and hence by the terser pre-1931 language. Changes of substance, however, mark a departure from the pre-1931 clause and (since the 1932 amendments were not retroactive) "I will preserve the vitality of 5 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, June 6. 1932, as a dividing line. The committee reports on the 1932 amendment state that several of the changes were "to clarify" the Joint Resolution but that: "[Clertain new matter has also been added, which is without retroactive effect." s The reports explicitly stamp two of the changes as "clarifying:" "(2) The insertion of the words 'or for any period which does not in fact end before his death,' which is to reach, for example, a transfer where decedent, 70 years old, reserves the income for an extended term of years and dies during the term, or where he is to have the income from and after the death of another person until his own death, and such other person predeceases him. This is a clarifying change and does not represent new matter.
"(3) The insertion of the words 'the right to the income' in place of the words 'the income' is designed to reach a case where decedent had the right to the income, though he did not actually receive it. This is also a clarifying change." 1.0 Paragraph (2) of this report presents a curious problem. It provides that a transfer is taxable if the settlor retains a life estate contingent upon the death of another person and "such other person predeceases him." This is the case of a "contingent" life estate-the very provision involved in May v. Heiner. 9 ' One surely would have thought that the repudiation of May v. Heiner was complete, whether or not the preceding life tenant had predeceased the settlor. The Court in deciding the case indicated that, although the settlor '"apparently" did not survive the life beneficiary, the question was irrelevant. Yet the reports on the 1932 amendment suggest that a transfer with contingent life estate is taxable only if the preceding life tenant predeceases the settlor.
The qualification ("and such other person predeceases him") in paragraph (2) was at one time regarded as essential to imposition of the tax by the Treasury Department, presumably because of this statement in the reports, and the Regulations so provided."
2 In 1937, however, the Regulations were amended to include a transfer with a reservation of income "the actual enjoyment of which, by the decedent, was to be poftponed until the termination of a transferred precedent interest or estate.'"' 9 3 The corpus then would be included irrespective of whether the settlor, by surviving the intermediate life tenant, was in actual enjoyment of the income at the time of his death. The Tax Court has taken the view that the original ruling was correct. 1 "' Accepting this theory, a minority of the Tax Court has argued that the transfer is includible under another part of Section 811(c): viz., as a reservation of income by the settlor for a period " 'not ascertainable without reference' to [his] death." 195 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has found the corpus of such a trust includible, 9 ' but without stating whether a contingent life interest is a reservation by the settlor (a) for a period "which does not in fact end before his death" or (b) for a period "not ascertainable without reference to his death." It may be that the court thought that either clause would trap the transfer, though the dissenting minority of the Tax Court had thought only the second would do.' This also appears to be the Treasury's current construction. 19 The significance of the distinction is that clause (a) is declaratory of the Joint Resolu-tion and hence of the pre-1931 statutory phrase; consequently, pre-1931 transfers of this type would now be taxable. Clause (b), on the other hand, is said to be a change of substance from the earlier law; I if trusts of this type are included only by virtue of this clause, only those made after 1932 will be taxable. But the latter view leads to the astonishing conclusion that the Joint Resolution overruled May v. Heiner only in part (viz., where the settlor survives the intermediate life tenant), leaving untouched the very situation involved in that case (-viz., where the settlor does not survive the intermediate life tenant).-
The remaining two changes effected by the Revenue Act of 1932 are explained as follows:
"(1) The insertion of the words 'or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death,' is to reach, for example, a transfer where decedent reserved to himself semiannual pa)ments of the income of a trust which he had established, but vith the provision that no part of the trust income between the last semiannual payment to him and his death should be paid to him or his estate, or where he reserves the income, not necessarily for the remainder of his life, but for a period in the ascertainment of which the date of his death was a necessary element.
" (4) The insertion of the words 'either alone or in conjunction with any person' is to reach a case where decedent had a right, with the concurrence of another person or persons, to designate those who should possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom." 201 Since, as stated above, the committees acknowledge that the amendments introduced some "new matter . . . without retroactive effect," it may be surmised that, at least to some extent, these two changes go to substance. 20 2 If so, they reach transfers which were exempt under the Joint Resolution and hence under the original "possession and enjoyment" clause.
Change (1) embraces a device which is so patently an evasion of the existing statute that explicit inclusion seems unnecessary. A retention of income for life less a brief period could have been regarded, without stretching the Joint Resolution's phrase, as a transfer "for his life or for 
